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A Ricardian Model of International Trade with Oligopolistic 
Competition 
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ABSTRACT: This paper studies a Ricardian model of international trade with a continuum of 
products in a general equilibrium model in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition.  It 
provides a bridge between trade models based on perfect competition and models based on 
imperfect competition.  Compared with a model based on perfect competition, the incorporation 
of fixed cost leads to the result that an increase of domestic labor may increase the relative wage 
of the domestic country.   
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returns to scale, trade policy 
 
1. Introduction 
For Ricardian models, the source of international trade is that countries have different 
technologies.  In Ricardian models, the number of products is usually specified as an integer 
number.  With an integer number of products, equilibrium specialization pattern may change 
discontinuously with exogenous parameters.  In a pioneering paper, Dornbusch et al. (1977) have 
studied a Ricardian model with a continuum of products.  With this specification of a continuum 
of products, the number of products produced in an economy becomes a continuous variable.  As 
continuity is conducive to Riemann integration and differentiation, a time-honored result is that 
this assumption of a continuum of goods is very useful in conducting comparative static studies.  
It is not strange that the framework of Dornbusch et al. (1977) has been frequently used to 
generated useful insights.  For some examples, the continuum assumption is used in Matsuyama 
(2002) and Cheng et al. (2005). 
The existence of fixed costs of production is a salient feature of modern production 
(Chandler, 1990).  First, it is commonly believed that long-run growth depends on technological 
advances which rely on research and development expenditure (Romer, 1990).  Research and 
development expenditure are fixed costs.  Second, machines and buildings are also fixed costs of 
production.  Finally, there are also other types of fixed costs of production, such as advertising 
expenditure.  With the existence of significant fixed costs, market structure will be featured by 
imperfect competition.  In Dornbusch et al. (1977), the type of market structure is perfect 
competition.  One issue not addressed in their paper is whether results derived under perfect 
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competition are robust to the alternative assumption of imperfect competition.  Imperfect 
competition has been proposed by various scholars.  Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) argue that 
imperfect competition is a better characterization of many industries than perfect competition.  For 
example, the oil industry is dominated by a couple of colossal firms.  Chandler (1990) also argues 
that many significant industries in the United States such as the steel industry has been 
characterized by imperfect competition since early twentieth century.  Thus a Ricardian model 
incorporating imperfect competition is an interesting topic to study. 
In this paper, we study international trade based on differences in technologies.  One 
contribution of this paper lies in studying a Ricardian model of international trade in a general 
equilibrium framework in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition.  There are two 
countries: home and foreign.  Following Dornbusch et al. (1977), there is a continuum of products.  
To produce each product, a fixed cost and a marginal cost are needed.  Countries may have 
different marginal costs in the production of each product.  We show that the following results 
valid under perfect competition are robust under the alternative assumption of oligopolistic 
competition.  First, a decrease of foreign productivity increases the range of products produced in 
the home country and increases the relative wage rate in the home country.  Second, with positive 
transportation costs, a transfer from the foreign to the home country increases the relative wage 
rate of the home country.  Finally, a small tariff imposed by a country increases the relative wage 
rate of this country. 
We show that an increase of domestic population increases the range of products produced 
domestically.  However, it may also increase domestic wage rate.  This is different from the result 
based on perfect competition in which an increase of domestic population always decreases 
relative wage in the home country.  The reason is that there is an additional effect in this model: a 
higher domestic labor force increases the degree of competition in the product market and 
decreases the average cost and make domestic firms relatively more productive.  This higher 
productivity effect acts as a counter effect to the effect under perfect competition.  If the higher 
productivity effect dominates, an increase of domestic population is accompanied by an increase 
of relative wage rate of the home country.  We also show that a decrease of fixed costs across 
countries can also have income distribution effects. 
 The model’s incorporation of fixed costs of production leads to result fits nicely with 
reality.  With perfect competition, a country’s relative wage rate is negatively related to its labor 
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endowment.  Consistent with this model incorporating fixed costs of production, casual 
observation shows that there is no monotonic relationship between a country’s relative wage rate 
and its size.  First, for Canada and US, the two countries are similar in terms of their geographical 
sizes and culture.  The population in Canada is about one ninth of that of US.  However, the wage 
rate in Canada is lower than that in the US.  Second, China and India have the largest population 
in the world, but their wage rates are lower than the wage rate in the US. 
This paper also contributes to the literature by providing a bridge between trade models 
based on perfect competition and models based on imperfect competition.  With zero fixed costs, 
the model degenerates to a model of perfect competition as studied in Dornbusch et al. (1977).  
When countries have the same marginal costs in the production of all products, the model 
degenerates to a model of trade based on increasing returns to scale and oligopolistic competition, 
such as in Brander (1981), Markusen (1981), Horstmann and Markusen (1986), Lahiri and Ono 
(2004), and Zhou (2007a, 2007b). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  First, we set up the model and establish 
equilibrium conditions.  Second, we prove the existence of a unique equilibrium and conduct 
comparative static studies.  Third, we incorporate transportation costs into the framework and 
address the impact of an international transfer.  Fourth, we examine the impact of a tariff.  Finally, 
we identify some avenues for future research and conclude. 
 
2. The Model 
 There are two countries: home and foreign.  Variables corresponding to the foreign country 
are denoted by asterisk marks.  Foreign consumers are assumed to have the same preferences as 
domestic consumers.  In this section, there is no transportation cost between the two countries.  
Markets in the two countries are integrated.  For each product produced by firms, trade leads to 
equal price in the two countries. 
The number of consumers in the home country is L .  Each consumer supplies one unit of 
labor inelastically.  Labor is the only factor of production.  It is assumed that there is a continuum 
of products indexed by a number ]1,0[z .  To produce each product, there is a fixed cost and a 
marginal cost of production.  In terms of labor units, all products have the same level of fixed cost 
f .  This fixed cost is the same in both countries.  However, products may differ in terms of their 
marginal costs of production.  For the same product, the two countries may have different marginal 
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costs of production.  For product z , the marginal costs in terms of labor units in the two countries 
are denoted by )(z  and )(* z  respectively.  Products are indexed so that marginal costs are 
ranked in order of decreasing home country comparative advantage.  Relative marginal cost 
between the two countries is defined by 
    
)(
)(*)(
z
zzA

 , 0)(' zA .   
In the above specification, like Dornbusch et al. (1977), it is assumed that A  is a continuous 
function of z . 
A consumer’s consumption of product z  is )(zc .  A consumer’s utility function is 
specified as dzzc )(ln
1
0 .1  As firms earn a profit of zero in equilibrium, the only source of 
income is labor income.  The wage rate in the home country is w  and the price level of product z  
is )(zp .  A consumer’s budget constraint is wdzzczp  )()(
1
0
.  A consumer takes the wage rate 
and prices of products as given and chooses the quantities of consumption to maximize utility.  
With this type of utility function, utility maximization requires that a consumer spends a fixed 
percentage of income on each product: 
wzczp )()( .                                  (1) 
 Similarly, for foreign consumers, utility maximization leads to 
     *)(*)( wzczp  .                                  (2) 
Firms producing the same product are identical.  Like Zhou (2004, 2007a, 2007b), firms 
producing the same product are assumed to engage in Cournot competition.2  The level of output 
for a firm producing product z  is )(zx .  A firm’s total revenue is xp  and its total cost is 
wxf )(  .  Thus a firm’s profit is wxfxp )(  .  For each firm, it takes the wage rate as given 
and chooses the level of output to maximize its profit.  Optimal choice of output requires that 
                                                 
1 Yu (2005) has studied a trade model with a general constant elasticity of substitution utility function.  To address 
North-South trade, Flam and Helpman (1987) and Matsuyama (2002) have studied trade models in which preferences 
are nonhomothetic. 
2 For some recent models of international trade based on monopolistic competition, see Schmitt and Yu (2001), Yu 
(2005), and Ederington and McCalman (2008). 
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w
x
pxp 

 .  The number of firms producing product z  is )(zm .3  Combination of results from 
a consumer’s utility maximization with a firm’s optimal choice of output leads to 
   w
zm
zp 


 
)(
11)( .4                       (3) 
Equation (3) shows that a firm’s price is a markup over its marginal cost of production w .  The 
markup factor decreases with the number of firms producing the same product.   
Similarly, for products produced in the foreign country, the relationship between price and 
marginal cost is 
    **
)(*
11)(* w
zm
zp 


  .                      (4) 
Free entry and exit lead to zero profit for each firm.  The zero-profit condition for a 
domestic firm requires that 
    0)]([)()(  wzxfzxzp  .                       (5) 
 Similarly, zero profit for a foreign firm requires that 
    0*)](**[)(*)(*  wzxfzxzp  .                     (6) 
Each country specializes in the production of products it has comparative advantage.  Let 
bz  denote the borderline product for which the price in the two countries is equal.  The home 
country will specialize in the range of products bzz 0  and the foreign country will specialize 
in the range of products 1 zzb .  This borderline product is defined by 
   )(*)( bb zpzp  .                        (7) 
For each product with ],0[ bzz  , the supply of this product is )()( zxzm .  The demand 
for this product is the sum of domestic demand cL  and foreign demand **cL , which is equal to 
** cLLc  .  Clearance of product market requires that supply equals demand for domestically 
produced goods: 
  )(**)()()( zcLzLczxzm  , for ],0[ bzz  .                     (8) 
                                                 
3 In this paper, the number of firms is a real number rather than restricted to be an integer number.  The number of 
firms is determined by the zero-profit condition.  Sections 3.7 and 4.5 of Brander (1995) provide survey of models of 
oligopolistic competition with fixed costs and free entry. 
4 Zhou (2004, 2007a, 2007b) has a detailed illustration of the derivation of this type of formula. 
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Product market equilibrium for foreign produced goods requires that supply equals demand 
for foreign produced goods: 
  )(**)()(*)(* zcLzLczxzm  , for ]1,[ bzz                       (9) 
In the home country, the total demand for labor is dzxfmb
z
)(
0
 .  The total supply of 
labor is equal to L .  Labor market equilibrium in the home country requires that labor demand 
equals labor supply: 
  Ldzxfmb
z
 )(0  .                      (10) 
Similarly, labor market equilibrium in the foreign country requires that 
   **)*(*
1
Ldzxfm
bz
  .                      (11) 
 Equations (1)-(11) form a system of 11 equations defining 11 variables w , *w , c , *c , m
, *m , x , *x , p , *p , and bz .5  An equilibrium is a tuple ( w , *w , c , *c , m , *m , x , *x , p , 
*p , bz ) satisfying equations (1)-(11). 
 
3. Comparative Statics 
 In this section, we first establish the existence of a unique equilibrium and then perform 
comparative static studies to explore properties of the equilibrium. 
By plugging the value of m  from (3) and the value of x  from (5) into (10), we get the 
following equation: 
    *)*( LwwLzwL b  .                     (12) 
Equation (12) can also be interpreted as that equilibrium in the market for products produced in 
the home country requires that domestic labor income wL  equals world spending on domestically 
produced goods. 
 From equations (1), (3), (5), (7), and (8), the price of a product is 
   
**
1
)()(
LwwL
fw
wzzp


  .                      (13) 
                                                 
5 Strictly speaking, w , *w , c , *c , m , *m , x , *x , p , and *p  are functions of z . 
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Equation (13) shows that the price of a product increases monotonically with its marginal cost of 
production. 
Let the wage rate in the foreign country be normalized to one: 1* w .  With this 
normalization, the domestic wage rate also denotes the wage ratio between the two countries. 
Rearrangement of equation (12) leads to 
  0*)1(1  LzwLz bb .                       (14) 
Equations (7) and (13) lead to 
  0
*
1
)(
*
12 










LwL
fw
w
zA
LwL
f b .                   (15) 
The effect of a uniform change of the technology of the foreign country can be captured by 
a change of A .  This type of change may be caused by the adoption of a general-purpose 
technology in the foreign country.  A decrease of A  means a uniform proportional reduction of 
foreign marginal cost.  Equations (14) and (15) form a system of two equations defining w  and 
bz  as functions of exogenous parameters.  When the level of fixed cost f  equals zero, this system 
degenerates to the case of perfect competition, as studied in Dornbusch et al. (1977).  From 
equation (14), 0/1  bz , and 0/1  w .  Thus, 1  shows a positive relationship between 
bz  and w .  From equation (15), 0/2  bz , and 0/2  w .  Thus, 2  shows a negative 
relationship between bz  and w .   
The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium. 
Proof: Existence: Plug the value of w  from (14) into (15) leads to the following equation 
defining bz  implicitly: 
01
*
)1(
)(
*
)1(
1 




L
fz
Lz
Lz
zA
L
fz b
b
b
b
b . 
For 0bz , 0 .  For 1bz , 0 .  Since   is a continuous function of bz , there exists at 
least one value of bz  such that 0 . 
Uniqueness: Since 1  depicts a positive relationship and 2  depicts a negative 
relationship between bz  and w , 1  and 2  will intersect only once. ■ 
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We now explore the properties of the equilibrium.  Total differentiation of 1  and 2  
with respect to bz , w , f , L , and A  leads to 
  























dw
dz
wz
wz b
b
b
22
11
dA
A
dL
L
Ldf
f 









































2
2
1
2
00
.                  (16) 
Let   denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix.  Since 0/1  bz , 0/1  w
, 0/2  bz , and 0/2  w , it is clear that 0 .   
 The following proposition studies the impact of a uniform change of foreign productivity. 
 
 Proposition 2 A decrease in foreign productivity increases the range of products produced 
in the home country and increases the relative wage of the home country. 
 Proof: Application of Cramer’s rule to (16) leads to 
   0/21 




AwdA
dzb , 
   0/21 




AzdA
dw
b
.  ■ 
 
 Results in Proposition 2 are consistent with intuition.  A higher marginal cost in the foreign 
country means a lower productivity in the foreign country.  As a result, the range of products 
produced by the foreign country decreases and the relative wage of the foreign country decreases. 
 
 Proposition 3 0
df
dzb  and 0
df
dw  if and only if wzA b )( . 
 Proof: From (15), it can be shown that 0/2  f  if and only if wzA b )( .  
Application of Cramer’s rule to (16) leads to 



 /21
fwdf
dzb , and 



 /21
fzdf
dw
b
.  Thus 
0
df
dzb  and 0
df
dw  if and only if wzA b )( .  ■ 
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 The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows.  A decrease of fixed cost decreases price 
of products produced in both countries.  If wzA b )( , the foreign country’s wage rate is 
relatively high.  A decrease of fixed cost has a larger impact on the home country.  As a result, the 
range of products produced in the home country and the wage rate increases. 
 The following proposition studies the impact of a change of domestic population. 
 
 Proposition 4 (i) 0/ dLdzb ; (ii) A sufficient condition for 0/ dLdw  is that 
)( bzAw  .  
 Proof: Application of Cramer’s rule to (16) leads to 
   0/2121 












wLLwdL
dzb ,        
   










 /2121
LzzLdL
dw
bb
.        
 Partial differentiation of (15) yields 
    wzAwLwLf
dL
d
b /)(1*)(2
1 2/32/12   .       
From the above two equations, a sufficient condition for 0/ dLdw  is that )( bzAw  .         ■ 
         
 Proposition 4 shows that an increase of the domestic population increases the range of 
products produced by the home country.  This result is consistent with Dornbusch et al. (1977).  
Proposition 4 also shows that an increase of domestic population may increase the relative wage 
rate of the home country.  This is different from Dornbusch et al. (1977) in which a perfect 
competition framework is used.  In Dornbusch et al. (1977), with an increase of labor force in the 
home country, at the initial wage rate, the home country will have a trade deficit.  A decrease of 
wage rate will eliminate this trade deficit.  Under perfect competition, an increase of domestic 
labor always decreases the relative wage rate in the home country.  In this paper, there is one 
additional effect.  Under oligopolistic competition, a firm’s price is a markup over its marginal 
cost.  The markup factor depends on the degree of competition in the product market.  The higher 
the degree of competition, the lower the degree of markup.  With an increase of domestic labor 
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force, more firms will produce the same product in the home country.  This decreases the price.  
As firms earn profits of zero, the price is equal to the average cost of production.  If the decrease 
of average cost is sufficiently strong, the real wage rate in the home country increases with the 
domestic labor force.  A necessary condition for this is that the wage ratio is less than the relative 
productivity at the cutoff level of product. 
When countries have the same marginal costs in the production of all products, the model 
degenerates to models of trade based on increasing returns to scale and oligopolistic competition, 
such as Brander (1981), Markusen (1981), Horstmann and Markusen (1986), Lahiri and Ono 
(2004), and Zhou (2007a, 2007b).  Like models based on increasing returns, as countries have the 
same technology and labor is the only factor of production, which country exports which product 
is undetermined. 
 In the case of perfect competition as in Dornbusch et al. (1977), the only source of the gains 
from trade is that each country specializes in the production of products with comparative 
advantage.  In this model, there is an additional source of the gains from trade.  With trade, the 
size of the market is the world market which is larger than each national market.  As shown in 
Brander (1981) and Markusen (1981), with imperfect competition, the opening of trade leads to a 
lower level of monopoly distortion and a lower price.  Thus the opening of trade is always 
beneficial. 
 
4. Transportation Cost and Impact of An International Transfer 
In this section, transportation costs are incorporated into the model and the impact of an 
international transfer is studied.  As discussed in Caves et al. (2007, Chapter 4), the transfer 
problem is relevant in various situations, such as war reparations and debt relief. 
Samuelson (1952, 1954) has studied the impact of a transfer on the paying country’s terms 
of trade when there are two products and the market structure is perfect competition.  Following 
Samuelson (1954), transportation cost is specified as the iceberg type: for each unit of product sent 
out, only g  percent arrives, and 10  g .  This percentage is assumed to be the same for all 
products.  The incorporation of transportation costs leads to the existence of nontraded goods.  For 
goods in the range ],0[ hz , they are produced by the home country only.  For goods in the range 
),( fh zz , they are nontraded and produced by both countries.  For goods in the range ]1,[ fz , they 
are produced by the foreign country only. 
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 For goods in the range ],0[ hz  produced in the home country, product market equilibrium 
requires that supply equals demand: 
    **1 cL
g
Lcmx  .                      (17) 
For goods in the range ]1,[ fz  produced in the foreign country, product market equilibrium 
requires that supply equals demand: 
    **1** cLLc
g
xm  .                     (18) 
 Let the level of transfer from the foreign country to the home country in terms of labor 
units in the foreign country be denoted by T .  A domestic resident’s disposable income is the sum 
of the wage rate and the transfer.  Each consumer in the home country receives a transfer of LT /
.  The budget constraint for a domestic resident is 
    
L
Twpcdz 
1
0
.                      (19) 
 A foreign resident’s disposable income is the difference between the foreign wage rate and 
the transfer.  The budget constraint for a foreign resident is 
    
*
***
1
0 L
Twdzcp  .                     (20) 
 For product hz , the price of this product in the home country plus the transportation cost 
equals its price in the foreign country: 
    )(*)( hh zpzpg  .                      (21) 
 For product fz , the price of this product in the foreign country plus the transportation cost 
equals its price in the home country: 
    )(*)( ff zpgzp  .                      (22) 
Labor market equilibrium in the home country requires labor demand equals labor supply: 
Ldzxfmdzxfm f
h
h z
z
z
  )()(0  .                    (23) 
Labor market equilibrium in the foreign country requires labor demand equals labor 
supply: 
   **)*(*)(
1
Ldzxfmdzxfm
f
f
h z
z
z
   .                   (24) 
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 With transportation costs, equations (3)-(6) are still valid.  Together with equations (17)-
(24), they form a system of twelve equations defining twelve variables w , *w , c , *c , m , *m , 
x , *x , p , *p , hz , and fz .  This system of equations can be simplified to the following system 
of equations: 
  0)*()1)((1  hf zTLzTwL ,6                     (25) 
  0
*
1
)(
*
12 







LwL
fw
gw
zA
LwL
f h ,                    (26) 
  0
*
1
)(
*
13 







LwL
fw
w
zgA
LwL
f f .                    (27) 
 When there is no transportation cost ( 1g ), fh zz  .  In this case, the system of equations 
(25)-(27) degenerates to the system of equations (14)-(15).  Since the level of transfer T  drops out 
of the system when there is no transportation cost, we come to the well-known result (Samuelson, 
1952; Dorbusch et al., 1977) that the relative wage rate is unaffected by the level of transfer when 
transportation cost is zero.  The following proposition studies the impact of a transfer when the 
transportation cost is positive. 
 
 Proposition 5 If transportation cost is positive, a transfer from the foreign country to the 
home country increases the relative wage of the home country, decreases the range of products 
exported from the home country and increases the range of products exported from the foreign 
country. 
 Proof: Differentiation of the system of equations (25)-(27) leads to 
   












































dw
dz
dz
wz
wz
wzz
f
h
f
h
fh
33
22
111
0
0 dT
T

















0
0
1
. 
                                                 
6 The derivation of (25) is similar to that of (14). 
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Let   denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix.  From (25)-(27), it can be shown 
that 0 .  Also, it can be shown that 01 

T
, 02 


hz
, 02 


w
, 03 


fz
, and 03 


w
.  Application of Cramer’s rule leads to  
  0/321 












 
fh zzTdT
dw , 
  0/321 








 
f
h
zwTdT
dz , 
  0/321 








 wzTdT
dz
h
f .  ■ 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is similar to that under perfect competition, as illustrated 
in Dornbusch et al. (1977) and Rogoff and Obstfeld (1996: chapter 4).  With a transfer from foreign 
to home, the demand for nontraded goods in the home country increases.  This leads to an increase 
of prices and the wage rate in the home country.  The increase of the wage rate in the home country 
decreases the competitiveness of products produced in the home country.  As a result, the range of 
products exported by the home country shrinks and the range of products exported by the foreign 
country expands. 
 
5. Impact of a Tariff 
 In this section, the impact of a tariff is studied.  The level of transportation cost is set to 
zero in this section.  Suppose the home country charges a uniform tariff over all products it imports.  
It is assumed that the tariff revenue is distributed to domestic consumers in a lump-sum form.  The 
tariff rate in the foreign country is equal to zero. 
The tariff rate is t .  With the existence of tariff, some products will be produced in both 
countries.  Similar to the previous section, for goods in the range ],0[ hz , they are produced by the 
home country only.  For goods in the range ),( fh zz , they are nontraded and produced by both 
countries.  For goods in the range ]1,[ fz , they are produced by the foreign country only. 
 For product hz , the prices in the two countries should be the same: 
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    )(*)( hh zpzp  .                      (28) 
For product fz , the price in the foreign country plus the tariff equal the price in the home 
country: 
    )(*)1()( ff zptzp  .                     (29) 
 A domestic consumer’s income is the sum of the wage income and the tariff revenue.  A 
domestic consumer’s budget constraint is 
    cdztpwpcdz
fz
*
11
0   .                     (30) 
 For goods in the range ],0[ hz , domestic firms produce for both domestic and foreign 
consumers.  Product market equilibrium in the world market requires that 
** cLLcxm  .                      (31) 
 For goods in the ]1,[ fz , foreign firms produce for both domestic and foreign consumers.  
Product market equilibrium in the world market requires that 
    **** cLLcxm  .                      (32) 
 With the existence of tariff, equations (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (23), and (24) are still valid.  
Together with equations (28)-(32), they form a system of twelve equations defining twelve 
variables w , *w , c , *c , m , *m , x , *x , p , *p , hz , and fz .  Like Section 4, the above 
system of equations can be simplified to the following system of equations: 
0*
1
)1(
1 

 h
f
f zL
tz
wLz
,                         (33) 
0
)1(*)1(
)1(
1
)(
)1(*
)1(
12 













tzLwLt
wtzf
w
zA
tzLwL
tzf
f
fh
f
f ,                    (34) 
0
)1(*)1(
)1(
1
)()1(
)1(*
)1(
13 















tzLwLt
wtzf
w
zAt
tzLwL
tzf
f
ff
f
f .                  (35) 
 Equations (33)-(35) form a system of three equations defining hz , fz , and w  as functions 
of exogenous variables.  When the level of tariff 0t , fh zz  .  In this case, the system of 
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equations (33)-(35) degenerates to the system of equations (14)-(15).  The following proposition 
studies the impact of a small tariff imposed by the home country.7 
 
 Proposition 6 When the initial tariff rate is zero, a small increase of tariff by the home 
country increases the relative wage rate of the home country.8 
 Proof: Differentiation of equations (33)-(35) with respect to hz , fz , w , and t  leads to 














































dw
dz
dz
wz
wzz
wzz
f
h
f
fh
fh
33
222
111
0
dt
t
t
t

























3
2
1
. 
Let   denote the determinant of the above coefficient matrix.  For 0t , it can be shown 
that 02 


fz
, and 03 


fz
.  Thus 0  when 0t .  For 0t , application of Cramer’s rule 
leads to 
   




















 /321321321
fhhffh zzttzzztzdt
dw . 
For 0t , the nominator of the right-hand side is positive.  Thus 0/ dtdw  when 0t .         ■ 
           
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is similar to the familiar terms of trade effect of a small 
tariff as illustrated in Feenstra (2004: chapter 7).  A tariff by the home country decreases the 
demand for foreign produced goods.  The reduced demand for foreign goods leads to a decrease 
of export prices of foreign produced goods.  This again leads to a decrease of foreign wage.  As a 
result, the relative wage of the home country increases. 
 
 
                                                 
7 If the foreign country also imposes a tariff, the welfare for each country may be lower than that when each country 
engages in free trade.  As shown by Johnson (1953), a country may gain from a tariff in a Nash equilibrium in which 
both countries set tariffs optimally. 
8 Like the proof of Proposition 6, it can be shown that the impact of a tariff on the range of domestically exported and 
foreign exported goods is ambiguous. 
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6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have studied a Ricardian model of international trade in a general 
equilibrium framework in which firms engage in oligopolistic competition and there is a 
continuum of products.  The model provides a bridge between perfect competition and imperfect 
competition.  First, when the level of fixed cost is zero, the model degenerates to the perfect 
competition case.  Second, when countries have the same marginal costs in the production of all 
products, the model degenerates to a model of trade based on increasing returns to scale and 
oligopolistic competition.  We show that the following results valid under perfect competition are 
robust under the alternative assumption of oligopolistic competition.  First, a decrease of foreign 
productivity increases the range of products produced in the home country and increases the 
relative wage in the home country.  Second, with positive transportation costs, a transfer from the 
foreign to the home country increases the relative wage rate of the home country.  Finally, a small 
tariff imposed by a country increases the relative wage rate of this country.  Different from the 
case of perfect competition, we show that an increase of domestic population can increase domestic 
wage rate.  We also show that a decrease of fixed costs across countries can also have income 
distribution effects.   
 There are some interesting avenues for future research.  First, in this model, preference is 
homothetic.  To study North-South trade between countries with different income levels, 
nonhomothetic preferences may be incorporated into the model.  Second, in this model, 
technologies are exogenously given.  To address the endogenous determination of technologies, 
the model may be extended to a dynamic framework in which technologies are results of research 
and development expenditure.  Finally, in this model, various are real.  To study the impact of 
monetary policy and related issues, money and nominal rigidities may be incorporated into the 
model. 
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